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I. INTRODUCTION
It seems both fair and logical to think that a putative father, or a man
who is not the biological father of his child, should cease paying child support
once he has disestablished paternity. Surprisingly, in West Virginia and several
other jurisdictions, a putative father who has disestablished paternity is often
forced to pay child support if he is divorced and the child at issue was born dur-
ing his marriage. This problem is more prevalent in cases of divorce because
parties are expected to resolve all issues concerning the marriage, such as child
custody, child support, alimony, property settlements, and paternity, in a divorce
proceeding. If a putative father is not aware that paternity is at issue, how is he
expected to raise the issue of paternity in a divorce proceeding? Many courts
share the opinion that a final divorce order is a final adjudication on the merits
of all issues concerning a marriage.1 Therefore, if a final divorce order has been
rendered and a putative father subsequently discovers that he is not the biologi-
I See Nancy Darlene M. v. James Lee M., Jr., 400 S.E.2d 882, 885 (W. Va. 1990), amended
by 464 S.E.2d 79 (w. Va. 1995).
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cal father of a child born during his marriage, he is barred, by the doctrine of res
judicata, from raising the issue of paternity. 2
While the core of this Note focuses on the doctrine of res judicata as it
relates to final divorce decrees, using the West Virginia case of Betty L. W. v.
William E. W.3 as a point of reference, this article also discusses paternity fraud,
the most common reason why putative fathers are faced with this precarious
circumstance. While West Virginia courts have openly recognized fraud as an
exception to the doctrine of res judicata,4 public policy often dictates whether a
court will allow a putative father to cease making child support payments.
5
West Virginia public policy strongly encourages the West Virginia judiciary to
consider the best interests and rights of a child when deciding any matter related
to a child's welfare. 6 As a result, the interests of putative fathers, who are vic-
tims of paternity fraud, and the best interests of the innocent children involved,
become increasingly more difficult to reconcile. Accordingly, this paper pre-
dicts the West Virginia judiciary's response to the current trend developing in
paternity fraud cases and explores the reasons for the difficulty in reaching West
Virginia's solution to this problem.
Part II of this Note, entitled "Res Judicata," contains an introduction to
the leading case, Bettty L. W., a definition and explanation of the doctrine of res
judicata, an exploration of the issues that arise when res judicata is applied to
cases of divorce, and a discussion regarding the various exceptions to res judi-
cata. Part III concentrates on the most significant exception to res judicata -
fraud. In this part, fraud and fraudulent concealment will be defined in length.
This part also contains a discussion of cases dealing with fraud and paternity
disestablishment, the legislature's motivation behind instituting the harsh stan-
dard required to prove paternity fraud, the various types of fraud, and the public
policy considerations that emerge upon the application of fraud to paternity dis-
establishment cases. Part IV, "The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals'
Analysis of Betty L. W.," contains a critical examination of crucial errors in the
court's analysis of Betty L. W. Part V, "States that Refuse to Apply Res Judicata
in Paternity Disestablishment Cases," contains an explanation of the public pol-
icy concerns that other states have in applying res judicata to paternity disestab-
lishment cases. Finally, in Part VI, "West Virginia's Solution?," the article dis-
cusses the reasons for the difficulty in reaching West Virginia's solution to the
problems that arise when the doctrine of res judicata is applied to cases involv-
ing paternity fraud.
2 See id. at 887.
3 569 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 2002) (per curiam).
4 See Blake v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 498 S.E.2d 41, 49 (W. Va. 1997).
5 See In re Carol B., 550 S.E.2d 636, 643 (W. Va. 2001).
6 See id.
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II. REs JUDICATA
Betty L. W.7 is West Virginia's latest and most significant case concern-
ing the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' use of res judicata to preclude
a putative father from pursuing a paternity disestablishment cause of action. As
such, Betty L. W. will be a source of reference when exploring various theories
throughout this article. In Betty L. W., Betty filed for divorce in July of 1996.8
During her marriage to William, she gave birth to three children: Ruth, born in
1981; Stacy, born in 1984; and Crystal, born in 1989. 9 In her initial divorce
petition, Betty alleged that the three Iirls were "born of the parties' marriage"
and in William's answer he agreed. In addition, both parties stated, in an
agreed upon divorce order, that "three children had been born of the mar-
riage."'I l From 1996 through 2001, custody shifted between the parties.12 Wil-
liam initially had custody of Ruth, and then gained custody of Stacy while cus-
tody of Ruth shifted to Betty. 13 While William never had custody of Crystal, he
did exercise his right to visit Crystal. 4  In 2001, William discovered through
DNA testing that he was not Crystal's biological father and petitioned the court
to terminate his child support obligation on the basis that Crystal was not his
child. 15  The family law master and the lower court denied this petition based
on the doctrine of res judicata, reasoning that paternity was previously estab-
lished in the divorce decree.16 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
agreed with the family law master and the lower court and denied William's
petition based on the doctrine of res judicata.1
7
Res judicata "refers to 'claim preclusion"' because it precludes parties
from relitigating the same cause of action.18 Res judicata was created pursuant
7 569 S.E.2d at 77.
8 Id. at 80.
9 Id.
10 ld.
u Id.
12 ld. at 80 n.2.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 80-81.
16 Id. at81.
17 Id. at 86.
is Blake v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 498 S.E.2d 41, 48 (W. Va. 1997) (quoting Sattler
v. Bailey, 400 S.E.2d 220, 225 (W. Va. 1990)).
2005]
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to public policy. 19 The purpose of the doctrine is to avoid the "expense and
vexation attending relitigation of causes of action which have been fully and
fairly decided." 20  The doctrine is also designed to "'conserve [] judicial re-
sources and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of
inconsistent decisions."' 2 1 In Blake v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc.,
22
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals defined the term "cause of action"
for the purposes of res judicata and explained how courts determine whether a
subsequent cause of action differs from a prior cause of action.23 A "cause of
action" is "'the fact or facts which establish or give rise to a right of action, the
existence of which affords a party a right to judicial relief.' 24 In order to de-
termine whether a cause of action is identical, for res judicata purposes, the
court must determine "whether the same evidence would support both actions
and issues." 25 If the "'two cases require substantially different evidence to sus-
tain them,"' the subsequent case is not barred by res judicata because the causes
of action are not identical. 26 The court further explained that a lawsuit might be
barred based on the doctrine of res judicata if three elements are satisfied: (1)
there must have been a "final adjudication on the merits in the prior action"; (2)
the two actions must involve the same parties or parties in privily with those
same parties; and (3) the cause of action in the subsequent proceeding "either
must be identical to the cause of action determined in the prior action or must be
such that it could have been resolved, had it been presented, in the prior ac-
tion.
27
The court elaborated on the third element. The court explained that
when applying the third element, it is necessary to consider whether or not the
"party bringing the subsequent lawsuit was, during the prior action, able to fore-
see the consequences of his/her failure to raise the subsequently raised issue in
the prior action."'28 Furthermore, "where a plaintiff bringing a subsequent law-
suit was not able to discover or otherwise ascertain his/her claim until after the
19 See id.
20 Sattler v. Bailey, 400 S.E.2d 220, 225 (W. Va. 1990).
21 Slider v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 557 S.E.2d 883, 887 (W. Va. 2001) (quoting
Conley v. Spillers, 301 S.E.2d 216, 220 (W. Va. 1983)).
22 498 S.E.2d at 4 1.
23 id. at 48-50.
24 Id. at 48 (quoting White v. SWCC, 262 S.E.2d 752, 756 (W. Va. 1980)).
25 Id. (quoting White, 262 S.E.2d at 756).
26 Id. (quoting White, 262 S.E.2d at 756).
27 Id. at 49.
28 ld.
[Vol. 107
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final adjudication of the prior action, his/her subsequent suit may not automati-
cally be precluded on the basis of resjudicata."
2 9
According to Blake, res judicata may not bar a subsequent cause of ac-
tion if the existence of the claim is not discoverable until after the final adjudica-
tion of the matter. 30 Thus, one would be inclined to believe that William should
have been able to institute a subsequent action to cease child support payments
for Crystal since he discovered, after his final divorce order, that he was not
Crystal's biological father. However, the doctrine of res judicata is all encom-
passing; it can bar a subsequent cause of action if a claim raised in a subsequent
cause of action is merely related to a prior cause of action.31 The court stated,
"[a]n adjudication by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-
matter and the parties is final and conclusive, not only as to the
matters actually determined, but as to every other matter which
the parties might have litigated as incident thereto and coming
within the legitimate purview of the subject-matter of the ac-
tion. It is not essential that the matter should have been for-
mally put in issue in a former suit, but it is sufficient that the
status of the suit was such that the parties might have had the
matter disposed of on its merits."
32
Therefore, even though William disestablished paternity after the final divorce
order, the doctrine of res judicata barred his subsequent action to terminate child
support because the issues of child support and paternity are within the purview
of a divorce proceeding.
33
A. Res Judicata in Divorce
West Virginia has frequently recognized that any matter relating to a di-
vorce order cannot be adjudicated after a final divorce order has been ren-
dered. 34 Thus, even if the issue of paternity was not formally raised or adjudi-
cated in a divorce proceeding, the subsequent adjudication of any issues relating
29 Id.
30 Id
31 Id. at 48-49.
32 Id. (quoting Sayre's Adm'r v. Harpold, 11 S.E. 16, 17 (W. Va. 1890)).
33 Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 86 (W. Va. 2002) (per curiam).
34 See Nancy Darlene M. v. James Lee M., Jr., 400 S.E.2d 882, 885 (W. Va. 1990), amended
by 464 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1995). "It is a general principle that an 'adjudication in a divorce or
annulment action concerning the paternity of a child is res judicata as to the husband or wife in
any subsequent action or proceeding."' Id. (quoting Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Effect, in
Subsequent Proceedings, of Paternity Findings or Implications in Divorce or Annulment Decree
or in Support or Custody Order Made Incident Thereto, 78 A.L.R.3d 846, 853 (1977)).
2005]
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to a divorce, such as paternity, custody, property settlements, child support, or
alimony, may be barred by the doctrine of res judicata.35
There are three main reasons why courts find a correlation between the
issue of paternity and a divorce proceeding. The primary reason is that when a
child is born during a marriage, there is an automatic presumption, though rebut-
table, that the parties are the biological parents of that child.36 As a result, pa-
ternity becomes an issue in an action for divorce even though paternity may not
have been specifically addressed.37 Secondly, when filing a divorce petition or
when responding to a divorce petition, both parties must acknowledge the chil-• • 38
dren born during their marriage. Accordingly, if a putative father and his ex-
wife agree in a final divorce order that a child was born during their marriage,
there is an "implication" that the parties have established paternity at the close
of a divorce proceeding. 39 Finally, the most compelling reason that courts relate
the issue of paternity to a divorce proceeding is that a divorce proceeding is the
appropriate forum to dispute paternity between married couples. The West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals explained, "'[i]t is not essential that the matter
should have been formally put in issue in a former suit, but it is sufficient that
the status of the suit was such that the parties might have had the matter dis-
posed of on its merits.' 4° Often times a negative finding of paternity is the
catalyst for divorce.
35 See id at 885-87.
In Hackley... the husband filed a petition seeking blood testing over 2 years
after the divorce decree became final. The Michigan Supreme Court stated
that the child support order in a divorce decree was an adjudication of pater-
nity. Further, it asserted that a finding in a divorce decree that the child was
born of the marriage conclusively established paternity. The court concluded
that because the husband did not appeal the divorce, he was barred by virtue
of res judicata from relitigating the issue in a subsequent proceeding.
Spears v. Spears, 784 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
36 See State Child Support Enforcement Div. v. Prichard, 542 S.E.2d 925, 929 (W. Va. 2000).
"[A] presumption of legitimacy arises when a child is born or conceived during marriage." Id.
(citing Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866 (W. Va. 1989)).
37 "[A]ithough family court may not make specific findings regarding paternity in a divorce
action, paternity may be implied ... " Beyer v. Metze, 482 S.E.2d 789, 791 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)
(quoting Zupanec, supra note 34, at 848 n.4).
38 Betty L. W., 569 S.E.2d at 78-81.
39 See Spears, 784 S.W.2d at 607. "Res judicata has been held to bar subsequent proceedings
where there have been paternity findings or implications made in a prior divorce decree or support
order." Id.
40 See Nancy Darlene M, 400 S.E.2d at 885-86 (quoting Sayre's Adm'r v. Hapold, 11 S.E. 16
(W. Va. 1890)).
[Vol. 107
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B. Exceptions to Res Judicata
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recognized a few lim-
ited exceptions to the doctrine of res judicata. For instance, Rule 60(b) of the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to obtain relief from a
final judgment. 4 1 Rule 60 (b) states,
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may re-
lieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judg-
ment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) Mis-
take, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or unavoidable
cause; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of
an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than
one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken.
42
Accordingly, a father who wishes to disestablish paternity has one year from the
time a final divorce order has been rendered to prove mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, excusable neglect, unavoidable cause, newly discovered evidence,
fraud, misrepresentation, misconduct, or any other element that would justify
relief from a final judgment.43 While one year seems to be a reasonable amount
of time to prove a number of these claims, for William in Betty L. W., and in
cases where ex-wives seek to conceal the identity of their child's biological fa-
ther through fraud or misrepresentation, one year is insufficient.
One alternative to the Rule 60(b) exception exists in the doctrine of res
judicata itself. In Blake, the court recognized that an exception to res judicata
exists where the party instituting the subsequent lawsuit bases his/her claim on
"fraud, mistake, concealment, or [a] misrepresentation by the defendant of the
41 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
42 Id.
43 Id. (illustrating that after one year, any matter related to a final divorce decree is res judicata
in a subsequent hearing). Thus, after the expiration of the eight-month appeal period, the [ali-
mony and child support] order of the Circuit Court of Mineral County in 1975 became final and
enforceable. Robinson v. Robinson, 288 S.E.2d 161, 163 (W. Va. 1982).
20051
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second suit [that] prevented the subsequent plaintiff from earlier discovering or
litigating his/her claims."'44 The court also explained the public policy concerns
that facilitated the creation of this exception.4 5 The court recognized that a de-
fendant "'cannot justly object to being sued on a part or phase of a claim that the
plaintiff failed to include in an earlier action because of the defendant's own
fraud.' 4 6 Additionally, the court noted that "'the result is the same when the
defendant was not fraudulent, but by an innocent misrepresentation prevented
the plaintiff from including the entire claim in the original action."'
47
III. FRAUD AND FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
The fraud exception to res judicata is the most popular remedy in pater-
nity disestablishment cases. There has been a dramatic increase in paternity
fraud cases within the past six years.
In 1999 alone, almost one-third of 280,000 paternity cases
evaluated by the American Association for Blood Banks ex-
cluded the individual tested as the biological father of the child.
In a period of only one-year, that is almost 100,000 men who
were falsely accused of being the father of a child which they
simply did not father.
48
Victims have assumed a more active role in combating paternity fraud.
Several organizations such as US Citizens against Paternity Fraud and Mensac-
tivism.org have been established to provide information about paternity fraud, to
assist putative fathers in getting DNA testing to determine paternity, and to in-
form paternity fraud victims about the existing laws regarding paternity fraud.
Unfortunately, lack of awareness has prevented many putative fathers
from raising the issue of fraud in paternity disestablishment cases. A clear un-
derstanding of fraud and how it relates to paternity disestablishment cases may
encourage victims of paternity fraud to examine their legal options. Accord-
ingly, this section defines fraud and fraudulent concealment, explains each ele-
ment of fraudulent concealment in light of paternity disestablishment cases,
discusses the government's motivation behind instituting a heightened standard
when proving paternity fraud, and discusses other types of fraud not recognized
in West Virginia.
44 498 S.E.2d 41, 49 (W. Va. 1997).
45 Id.
46 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. j (1982)).
47 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. j (1982)).
48 Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 88 (W. Va. 2002) (per curiam) (Maynard, J.,
dissenting).
[Vol. 107
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In West Virginia, fraud or fraudulent concealment is defined as "'all
acts, omissions, and concealments which involve a breach of legal duty, trust or
confidence justly reposed, and which are injurious to another, or by which un-
due and unconscientious advantage is taken of another."' 49 In order to prove
fraud, the essential elements are
"(1) that the act claimed to be fraudulent was the act of the de-
fendant or induced by him; (2) that it was material and false;
that plaintiff relied on it and was justified under the circum-
stances in relying upon it; and (3) that he was damaged because
he relied on it."
5
As stated above, an action for fraudulent concealment may "arise by the
concealment of truth." 51 Fraudulent concealment involves the deliberate non-
disclosure of material facts aimed at preventing another from learning the
truth.52 In order for a party to prevail on a claim of fraudulent concealment, he
or she needs to "'demonstrate that [the] defendant took some action affirmative
in nature designed or intended to prevent, and which does prevent, the discovery
of facts giving rise to the fraud claim, some artifice to prevent knowledge of the
facts or some representation intended to exclude suspicion and prevent in-
quiry. '53 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 550 Comment b explains the
type of "wrongful behavior" that amounts to fraudulent concealment. 54 This
comment states,
[Fraudulent concealment may arise] when the defendant suc-
cessfully prevents the plaintiff from making an investigation
that he would otherwise have made, and which, if made, would
have disclosed the facts; or when the defendant frustrates an in-
vestigation .... Even a false denial of knowledge or informa-
tion by one party to a transaction, who is in possession of the
facts, may subject him to liability as fully as if he had expressly
misstated the facts, if its effect upon the plaintiff is to lead him
to believe that the facts do no exist or cannot be discovered.
55
49 Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 752 (W. Va. 1998) (citing Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co.,
285 S.E.2d 679, 682 (W. Va. 1981)).
5o Id. (quoting Lengyel v. Lint, 280 S.E.2d 66, 69 (W. Va. 1981)).
51 Id. (quoting Teter v. Old Colony Co., 441 S.E.2d 728, 734 (W. Va. 1994)).
52 Id. (quoting Van Deusen v. Snead, 441 S.E.2d 207, 209 (Va. 1994).
53 Id. at 753 (quoting Lock v. Schreppler, 426 A.2d 856, 860 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981)).
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550 cmt. b (1977).
5 Id.
2005]
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If a punitive father can prove that his ex-wife falsely represented that he
was the biological father of their child,56 fraudulent concealment might be the
most feasible remedy for putative fathers who wish to institute a subsequent
paternity action after a final divorce order has been rendered. 57 However, a
putative father must bear in mind that fraudulent concealment is a difficult cause
of action to prove because "[m]ere silence in the absence of a duty to speak...
cannot suffice to prove fraudulent concealment."58 In order for courts to deter-
mine whether the concealment of a child's biological father amounts to fraud,
the mother must have a legal duty to disclose paternity to the putative father.
59
According to Doe v. Doe, concealment on the basis of fraud can impose a duty
to speak when a "marital or other confidential relationship" exists.
60
A putative father must also be able to prove, by "clear and convincing
evidence," that his ex-wife knowingly concealed the true paternity of their
child. As far as a wife's awareness of her child's paternity, courts do not re-
quire that a wife be certain that her husband is not the father of their child;
56 See Anderson v. Anderson, 746 So.2d 525, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
The trial court apparently applied the principle that a divorce decree which es-
tablishes the paternity of a child is a final determination of paternity and is res
judicata in any future proceedings. An exception to this rule is when the father
is misled into believing that he is the father, and therefore does not challenge
paternity at the time of the divorce, because the wife fraudulently conceals the
child's parentage.
Id.; see also B.O. v. C.O., 590 A.2d 313, 315 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
57 See Dep't of Human Res. v. Hurst, 432 S.E.2d 236, 237 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (Blackburn, J.,
concurring).
Generally, where a final judgment in a prior divorce proceeding adjudicates
the issue of paternity, the father is bound by that judgment and may not resur-
rect the issue in a subsequent child support or contempt proceeding brought
against the father by the Department of Human Resources. However, there
are exceptions to that general rule, one of which must be where the prior
judgment was obtained by fraud .... If ever there was fraud that would cause
setting aside a divorce judgment ordering a man to pay child support, conceal-
ing another man's paternity of the child would be such fraud.
id. (citation omitted).
58 Sevin v. Kelshaw, 611 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
59 See Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 752 (W. Va. 1998).
60 712 A.2d 132, 161 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998), rev'd, 747 A.2d 617 (Md. 2000) (quoting
B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1183-84 (Md. 1998)).
61 G.M. v. R.G., 566 S.E.2d 887, 890 (W. Va. 2002).
62 See B.O. v. C.O., 590 A.2d at 316. "[I]t is well settled that fraud is proved when it shown
[sic] that the false representation was made knowingly, or in conscious ignorance of the truth, or
recklessly without caring whether it be true or false." Id. (quoting Warren Balderston Co. v. In-
tegrity Trust Co., 170 A. 282 (Pa. 1934)).
[Vol. 107
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rather, courts look to the wife's intent. 63 A pertinent exemplification of this
element is illustrated in B.O. v. CO. 64 In B.O. v. CO., a superior court in Penn-
sylvania recognized that,
We can not say that B.O.'s representation that C.O. was Bran-
don's father, was made knowingly or in conscious ignorance of
the truth. Prior to Brandon's conception, B.O. was engaging in
sexual relations with C.O., and thus we cannot conclude that
she knew he was not the father at the time she made the repre-
sentations concerning his paternity. However, as much can not
be said of her second statement. Short of her having an inability
to recall having had sexual intercourse with a man during the
period of conception, of which there is no evidence or allega-
tion, she must have known that her representation that she had
been faithful to C.O. for five years prior to conception was
false.
65
Accordingly, a mother may be liable for fraud if she made a statement as to the
paternity of her child with knowledge or belief that the matter is not as she
represents it to be, she "does not have the confidence in the accuracy of the rep-
resentation that is stated or implied, or [she] knows that there is not the basis for
4,6
the representation that is stated or implied .... While West Virginia law
does not impose an affirmative duty upon mothers to disclose their uncertainties
as to the paternity of their children in a divorce petition, mothers do have a re-
sponsibility to execute a divorce petition with truth and accuracy.
67
Fraudulent concealment also requires inducement.68 In B.O., the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania looked to the mother's behavior to determine in-
ducement. 69 The facts of this case revealed that B.O. falsely represented that
C.O. was Brandon's father. 70 B.O. stated that she had not "slept with anyone
else within the last five years." 71 She made this statement at trial and in two
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 315 n.1.
67 See generally W. VA. CODE § 4-5-401 (2001).
68 See Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 752 (W. Va. 1998). An essential element of fraud is
that "[t]he act claimed to be fraudulent was the act of the defendant or induced by him." Id. (quot-
ing Lengyel v. Lint, 280 S.E.2d 66 (W. Va. 1981)).
69 B.O., 590 A.2d at 315.
70 ld.
71 Id.
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letters sent to C.O., even though test results excluded C.O. as the father. 72 The
court found that these statements were made to induce C.O. into believing that
he was Brandon's father.73 The court stated, "[t]here can be no question that the
misrepresentations were made as an inducement for ... [the putative father] to
acknowledge Brandon as his son, and assume his financial obligation to support
him."
, 74
Fraudulent concealment may also arise if a mother takes affirmative
measures to prevent a putative father from investigating the paternity of their
child.75 Thus, a mother's failure to notify the putative father that she was un-
faithful during their marriage may be construed as fraud-inducing behavior.
Furthermore, fraudulent concealment requires proof that a putative fa-
ther was justified in believing that he biologically fathered his child. The sim-
ple fact that a child was born during a marriage does not create an irrebuttable
presumption that a putative father was justified in believing that he fathered his
child. 77 If a putative father was aware of his wife's infidelity, courts may find
that he was unjustified in believing he was the biological father of his child re-
gardless of whether the child was born during his marriage. 78 Conversely, if a
putative father was unaware that his wife had been unfaithful, he is likely to
convince a court that he was justified in believing that he was the biological
father of his child.
79
In addition to considering whether a putative father was aware that his
wife was unfaithful, courts may also consider the "character, intelligence, ex-
perience, age and mental and physical condition of the parties" to determine
whether aputative father was justified in believing that he biologically fathered
his child.8° In B.O., the court recognized that the putative father "was a man of
72 Id.
73 Id. at 316.
74 Id.
75 See Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 753 (W. Va. 1998).
76 See B. 0., 590 A.2d at 316. In determining fraud the court decided that the wife's misrepre-
sentations were justifiably relied upon. id.
77 See Lefler v. Lefler, 776 So.2d 319, 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). The court held that a
putative father was "'barred by estoppel and res judicata from raising the issue of a fraud upon the
court,' reasoning that [the putative father] '... had reason to believe that he was not the biological
father, and thus had the opportunity to defend against [the mother's] allegations."' Id. (quoting
Dep't of Revenue v. Edden, 761 So.2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
78 See Gonzalez v. Andreas, 369 A.2d 416 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (holding that since the [puta-
tive father] knew that his wife had previously borne two illegitimate children he did not reasona-
bly rely on her representations).
79 See B.0., 590 A.2d at 316.
80 Id.
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limited intelligence and limited experience in the world. ' 's  "He always lived
with his mother who took care of him, and had never before had a serious girl-
friend."'82  "He was also known to be subject to the influence of others, and
overly trusting." 83 Based on this information, the court found that "[it would
not be reasonable to expect C.O. to question Appellant's representations con-
cerning his paternity."
84
The last element necessary to prove fraudulent concealment is injury.85
While there are several damages that may occur as a result of fraudulent con-
cealment, the most obvious injury to a putative father in paternity cases is that
he is forced to assume a child support obligation for a child that he has not bio-
logically fathered.86 A putative father is legally compelled to make child sup-
port payments for a maximum of eighteen years unless the parties agree to an
extended period of support.87 If a relationship has been established between the
putative father and the child, it is probable that the putative father would con-
tinue to assume some financial obligation in the support of the child regardless
of a court order. However, there is a considerable difference between a volun-
tary child support obligation in comparison to a forced child support obligation.
In addition to paying child support, a putative father may suffer mental
and emotional distress from learning that he is not the biological father of the
child or children with whom he has developed a meaningful relationship. In
Day v. Heller,88 the court recognized that "[h]aving a close and loving parent-
child relationship suddenly destabilized by a revelation that there is no biologi-
cal relationship has the potential to cause grief, anxiety, shock, and fear." 89 The
court assessed the degree of injury based on the level of closeness between a
putative father and the child.90 While jurisdictions are split on whether to allow
a putative father to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress in a
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
86 See B.O., 590 A.2d at 316-17. "The damages are evident, as he committed himself to pro-
vide support payments for a period that could exceed eighteen years, even though he is not the
father." Id.
87 See W. VA. CODE § 48-11-103(a) (2001).
88 653 N.W.2d 475 (Neb. 2002).
89 Id. at 480.
90 Id. at 481. "The closer the plaintiff was to the child before he learned that he was not the
biological father, the greater the potential for disruption and the more likely that a disruption to the
relationship would cause him severe emotional distress." Id.
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paternity fraud case, courts have recognized that putative fathers do suffer injury
as a result of fraudulent concealment.
9I
As seen above, paternity fraud is a difficult cause of action for a puta-
tive father to prove. However, it is necessary to know that it is no coincidence
that the standard is heightened for proving paternity fraud. States have an inter-
est in ensuring that a child's paternity is acknowledged regardless of whether
this acknowledgement is made by a child's biological father or their putative
father. The federal government has set up a program that will allow states to
receive federal funds if they comply with the requirements of title IV-D,
92
which requires states to establish paternity and support orders for at least 75% of
cases referred to that state's IV-D agency. States are required to submit a
state plan, 94 which "consists of written documents furnished by the State to
cover its Child Support Enforcement program under title LV-D of the [Social
Security] Act"95 and describe "the nature and scope of its program ... giving
assurance that it will be administered in conformity with the specific require-
ments stipulated in title IV-D." 96 Under Title 45 Part 305.61 of the Code of
91 Id. at 480. "Not surprisingly, other courts have reached conflicting conclusions in deciding
whether to recognize similar claims [of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in pater-
nity fraud cases]." Id.
92 45 C.F.R. § 305.1(a) (2004).
The term IV-D case means a parent (mother, father, or putative father) who is
now or eventually may be obligated under law for the support of a child or
children receiving services under the title IV-D program. A parent is a sepa-
rate IV-D case for each family with a dependent child or children that the par-
ent may be obligated to support. If both parents are absent and liable or poten-
tially liable for support of a child or children receiving services under the IV-
D program, each parent is considered a separate IV-D case. In counting cases
for the purposes of this part, States may exclude cases closed under § 303.11
and cases over which the State has no jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction cases
are those in which a non-custodial parent resides in the civil jurisdictional
boundaries of another country or federally recognized Indian Tribe and no in-
come or assets of this individual are located or derived from outside that juris-
diction and the State has no other means through which to enforce the order.
Id.
93 Id. § 305.63(c)(2). "IV-D Agency means the single and separate organizational unit in the
State that has the responsibility for administering or supervising the administration of the State
plan under title IV-D of the Act." Id. § 301.1.
94 Id. "The State plan means the State plan for child and spousal support under section 454 of
the Act." Id.
95 Id. § 301.13.
96 Id. § 301.10.
The State plan is a comprehensive statement submitted by the IV-D agency
describing the nature and scope of its program and giving assurance that it will
be administered in conformity with the specific requirements stipulated in title
[Vol. 107
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Federal Rules, states will receive a monetary penalty by the federal government
if they fail to comply with the title IV-D requirements. 97 This irresistible pro-
gram serves as an incentive for states to enact rigid laws with regard to allowing
fathers to renounce paternity acknowledgements.
A. Types of Fraud
Some jurisdictions decide whether res judicata prevents a subsequent
paternity cause of action based on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
fraud. In Evans v. Gunter,98 the South Carolina Court of Appeals explained the
difference between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud.99 The court stated,
Intrinsic fraud refers to fraud presented and considered in the
judgment assailed, including perjury and forged documents pre-
sented at trial. Extrinsic fraud refers to fraud which are collat-
eral or external to the matter tried such as misleading acts which
prevent the movant from presenting all of his case. It is some
intentional act or conduct by which the prevailing party has
prevented the unsuccessful party from having a fair submission
of the controversy. "Relief is granted for extrinsic but not in-
trinsic fraud on the theory that the latter deception should be
discovered during the litigation itself, and to permit such relief
undermines the stability of all judgments."'100
According to Evans and many other courts, intrinsic fraud is not sufficient to
evoke the fraud exception to res judicata. 10 1 The court must find that the fraud
IV-D, the regulations in Subtitle A and this chapter of this title, and other ap-
plicable official issuances of the Department. The State plan contains all in-
formation necessary for the Office to determine whether the plan can be ap-
proved, as a basis for Federal financial participation in the State program.
Id.
97 Id. § 305.61.
A State will be subject to a financial penalty and the amounts otherwise pay-
able to the State under title IV-A of the Act will be reduced in accordance
with § 305.66 ... [i]f on the basis of. . . [t]he results of an audit under §
305.60 of this part, the State failed to substantially comply with one or more
of the requirements of the IV-D program, as defined in § 305.63 ....
Id.
98 366 S.E.2d44 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988).
99 Id. at 46.
100 Id. (quoting HARRY M. LIGHTSEY & JAMES F. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL
PROCEDURE 405 (2d ed. 1985)).
101 Id.
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alleged was extrinsic in nature in order to allow a subsequent paternity hear-
ing.
While the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recognized in-
trinsic and extrinsic fraud, it has only referred to this distinction in a limited
number of cases. 10 3 Rule 60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure
clearly states "fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic)."
' 04
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not delivered an opinion with
a detailed explanation of the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud.
Even in cases where the court provides a lengthy explanation of the principals of
fraud, as in Kessel v. Leavitt, 0 5 the court has not recognized the sub-
classifications of intrinsic and extrinsic fraud.
In addition to extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, some jurisdictions have rec-
ognized another type of fraud: fraud on the court.1 6 According to the Court of
Appeals in Indiana, "if a party establishes that an unconscionable plan or
scheme was used to improperly influence the court's decision, and that such acts
prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense,
then 'fraud on the court exists."' 107 For example, in the case of In re the Mar-
riage ofME. andD.E., 108 a putative father discovered that he was not the father
of his child almost three years after his divorce.10 9 The mother and the putative
father filed a joint petition to modify and set aside the paternity finding; how-
ever, the trial court refused to amend the paternity finding to terminate child
support. 110 The appellate court reversed the trial court decision and found fraud
102 See M.A.F. v. G.L.K, 573 So. 2d 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the wife's
concealment of the true parentage constituted extrinsic fraud upon the court, such that the hus-
band's petition to set aside would not be barred by res judicata); see also Love v. Love, 959 P.2d
523, 526 (Nev. 1998).
A decision of paternity will not operate as res judicata where extrinsic fraud
existed in the original proceeding. Where a claim is fraudulently advanced
and that fraud is so successful that the other party is not aware that he has a
particular claim or defense, this may be a sufficient basis for equitable relief.
Id.
103 See Miller v. County Comm'n of Boone County, 539 S.E.2d 770, 776 (W. Va. 2000).
"'[EJvidence of fraud or any other like matter which involves extrinsic evidence is not admissible
before a board of canvassers on a recount and can be presented only at election contest proceed-
ings."' Id. (quoting State ex rel. Patrick v. County Court, 165 S.E.2d 822, 824 (W. Va. 1969)).
104 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
10S 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1998).
106 In re Marriage of M.E., 622 N.E.2d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
107 Id. (quoting In re Paternity of Tompkins, 518 N.E.2d 500, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 580.
110 Id.
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on the court because "the perpetrated scheme misled the court as to the child's
paternity, prevented the child from having his day in court, and defrauded the
court with the fabricated paternity petition.
'' I I
There is no evidence that West Virginia recognizes fraud on the court,
intrinsic fraud, or extrinsic fraud, with respect to paternity fraud or otherwise. 1
12
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has adopted another approach
when dealing with paternity fraud cases.
B. West Virginia's Application of the Fraud Exception
West Virginia Code section 16-5-12(i)(4)(A) allows a parent to rescind
a paternity acknowledgement after sixty days if he or she can provide "specific
allegations concerning the elements of fraud, duress or mental mistake of
fact."'1 13 While the court in Betty L.WH 4 made reference to this fraud excep-
tion, it failed to make mention of the fraud exception in the doctrine of res judi-
cata and failed to seriously explore the issue of fraud altogether. The court may
have neglected to explore fraud because William did not raise the issue of fraud.
Regardless of whether William raised the issue of fraud, the court's opinion
suggests that the fraud exception to res judicata would still be insufficient to
allow a subsequent paternity cause of action. 115 The court recognized the fol-
lowing language from Withrow v. Webb:116 "[e]ven if the principle of resjudi-
cata were not applicable, it would seem to us that to grant the motion for a
blood-grouping test on this record, would open the door to unwarranted chal-
lenges of paternity, violate public policy, and clearly result in irreparable harm
to the child.' By citing this language, the court suggests that West Virginia
public policy would prohibit the court from allowing a subsequent paternity
cause of action regardless of whether William raised the fraud exception to res
judicata. 118
III Id. at 582-83.
112 While Rule 60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure briefly references intrinsic
and extrinsic fraud, W. VA. R. Civ. P. 60(b), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
never mentioned intrinsic or extrinsic fraud in an opinion, except when quoting Rule 60(b), nor
has the Court discussed or defined intrinsic or extrinsic fraud.
113 W. VA. CODE § 16-5-12(i)(4)(A) (Supp. 2004).
114 569 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 2002) (per curiam).
115 Id. at 83.
116 280 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
117 Betty L. W., 569 S.E.2d at 83 n.9 (quoting Withrow, 280 S.E.2d at 26).
118 See id. at 88 (Maynard, J., dissenting). "The majority, however, obviously subordinates the
punishment of paternity fraud and the relief of its victims to what it considers to be the best inter-
ests of the child." Id.
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Although West Virginia did not consider the fraud exception to res judi-
cata in Betty L. W., West Virginia has allowed a subsequent paternity cause of
action when there is evidence that a mother committed fraud. 119 In G.M v.
R. G., the appellant was a putative father who sought a rehearing after he learned
that he was not the biological father of a child for which he "acknowledged"
120
paternity. 12 1 In this case, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recog-
nized that a prior paternity acknowledgement could be challenged on the basis
of fraud and the court remanded the case in order to let the appellant develop
evidence of fraud.
1 22
Even though the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals allowed the
putative father to bring a subsequent cause of action based on fraud in G.M, this
decision was influenced by the fact that the parties involved in this case had
never been divorced, or for that matter married. 23 When parties have not un-
dergone a divorce, paternity, for the purposes of a child support award, is estab-
lished by a "paternity acknowledgement, rather than a divorce answer and de-
cree." In addition, West Virginia Code section 16-5-12 (i)(4)(A) allows a
single putative father to rescind a paternity acknowledgment after 60 days if he
can provide "specific alleations concerning the elements of fraud, duress or
mental mistake of fact." 1 2  Thus, a single putative father simply has to "ac-
knowledge" paternity, in accordance with West Virginia Code section 16-5-12
in order to be liable for child support. 126 Once he has acknowledged paternity,
he has the protection of West Virginia Code section 16-5-12, which allows him
to rescind his paternity acknowledgment in the event that he is not the biological
father of his child. 27 As a result, parties who wish to disestablish paternity and
who have never undergone a divorce are not affected by the doctrine of res judi-
cata.
119 See G.M. v. R.G., 566 S.E.2d 887, 890 (W. Va. 2002).
120 See W. VA. CODE § 16-5-12(i) (Supp. 2004).
A written, notarized acknowledgment of both the man and the woman that the
man is the father of a named child legally establishes the man as the father of
the child for all purposes and child support may be established pursuant to the
provisions of chapter forty-eight [§ § 48-1-101 et seq.] of this code.
Id.
121 G.M., 566 S.E.2d at 890.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 84 (W. Va. 2002) (per curiam).
125 W. VA. CODE § 16-5-12(i)(4)(A).
126 W. VA. CODE § 48-24-106 (2001).
127 ,'A
[Vol. 107
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 15
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss3/15
THE PLIGHT OF A PUTATIVE FATHER
The standard for divorced parties differs in comparison to single parties.
While single parties must acknowledge paternity, a child's paternity is presumed
when the child's mother is a married woman. 128 Once the couple undergoes a
divorce, the parties typically list the children born of the marriage in the divorce
degree thereby memorializing paternity in the divorce decree. 129 Since the stan-
dards are different, the court's ruling in G.M. would not have been applicable to
Betty L. W., even if William raised the issue of fraud in Betty L. W., because Wil-
liam and Betty were not privy to options available under West Virginia Code
section 16-5-12.130
Because, there are few West Virginia cases that expressly litigate pater-
nity fraud cases, one can only speculate as to how the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals will handle such cases. Paternity fraud cases will probably be
decided based entirely on West Virginia public policy. Since West Virginia has
a strong public policy of ensuring the rights and interests of West Virginia chil-
dren in cases concerning paternity, it is likely that West Virginia may align with
the majority in refusing to allow putative fathers to recover in cases of paternity
fraud.
C. West Virginia's Public Policy and its Relationship to Fraud
In Betty L. W the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals relied on the
case of Michael K T. v. Tina L. T. to discern West Virginia's policy regarding the
rights of children in paternity disestablishment cases. 131 In Michael K. T., the
parties were married in 1983 and gave birth to Brittany T. in 1985.132 Michael
sought a divorce against Tina in 1987 based on irreconcilable differences, one-
year separation, cruel and inhuman treatment, and adultery.' 33 In addition, Mi-
chael sought a court determination that no children were born during their mar-
128 See Betty L.W., 569 S.E.2d at 81.
129 See Beyer v. Metz, 482 S.E.2d 789, 790 (W. Va. 1997).
130 See Betty L. W., 569 S.E.2d at 83.
An adjudication of paternity, which is expressed in a divorce order, is resju-
dicata as to the husband and wife in any subsequent proceeding. Therefore,
the provisions of W. Va. Code, 48A-7-26 [1986], part of the Revised Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, W.Va.Code, 48A-7-1 to 48A-7-41,
as amended, which authorizes the adjudication of paternity under certain cir-
cumstances is not applicable if an adjudication of paternity is expressed in the
divorce order.
Id. (quoting Nancy Darlene M. v. James Lee M., Jr., 400 S.E.2d 882, 883 (W. Va. 1990)).
131 Id. at 81.
132 Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 868 (W. Va. 1989).
133 Id.
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riage based on his allegation that Brittany T. was not his child. 134 Two blood
tests were performed and both tests conclusively revealed that Michael was not
Brittany T.'s biological father. 135 The family law master found that the two
blood tests, which found that Brittany T. was not Michael's biological child,
along with the fact that Tina L.T. admitted to having sexual intercourse with
another man, was overwhelming evidence that Michael was not Brittany T.'s
father. 136 Conversely, the circuit court refused to follow the family law master's
recommendations with respect to declaring that Michael was not Brittany T.'s
father. 137 The court ordered that Brittany T. be declared Michael's legitimate
child and directed Michael to pay $345.00 per month for child support and
maintenance.
138
The court recognized that several factors must be considered in order to
decide whether to admit the blood test results to disestablish paternity.
139
These factors include:
(1) the length of time following when the putative father first
was placed on notice that he might be the biological father be-
fore he acted to contest paternity; (2) the length of time during
which the individual desiring to challenge paternity assumed the
role of father to the child; (3) the facts surrounding the putative
father's discovery of non-paternity; (4) the nature of the fa-
ther/child relationship; (5) the age of the child; (6) the harm
which may result to the child if paternity were successfully dis-
proved; (7) the extent to which the passage of time reduced the
chances of establishing paternity and a child support obligation
in favor of the child; and (8) all other factors which may affect
the equities involved in the potential disruption of the par-
ent/child relationship or the chances of undeniable harm to the
child. 140
The court remanded the case back to the circuit court to consider these fac-
tors. 
14 1
134 Id.
135 id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 872.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 873.
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While the court in Betty L. W. recognized that its opinion in Michael
K. T. "did not specifically address issues of res judicata," the court referred to
this case to discern the "rights of the child."'1 42 More specifically, the court rea-
soned that a child's rights need to be considered when a putative father seeks,
through blood testing, to disclaim paternity and "rebut the presumption of le-
gitimacy which has attached to a child born of a valid marriage."'143 The court
looks at the facts and circumstances of each case in order to e uitably determine
whether the case warrants the admission of blood test results.1t
Even though the court in Michael K.T. acknowledged that a child's
rights need to be considered in determining whether to allow blood testing to
disestablish paternity, the court also recognized that blood testing could be used
to disprove paternity if the court found evidence of a mother's fraudulent con-
duct. 145 The court stated, "absent evidence of fraudulent conduct which pre-
vented the putative father from questioning paternity, this Court will not sanc-
tion the disputation of paternity through blood test evidence."' 146 While this
statement seems to suggest that evidence of paternity fraud may be a suitable
basis upon which to allow a putative father to institute a subsequent cause of
action in a paternity disestablishment case, this is merely an assumption given
that the court has yet to decide a case concerning paternity fraud as an exception
to res judicata in paternity disestablishment cases. However, this may be an
unfounded assumption given the court's position with regard to the best interests
and/or rights of a child in paternity disestablishment cases:
Given the serious and long-lasting effects of bastardization,
resolution of the paternity issue should be accomplished with
the active participation of the court, rather than involvement
that is limited to reviewing a previously-executed document [a
stipulation agreeing to bastardize the child at issue]. This is
necessary to guarantee that the issue of paternity is not being
used as a bargaining tool, perhaps to secure a favorable mone-
tary award or some other preferred attainment. But, more im-
portantly, it is required to secure proper consideration of the
facts of the case in light of the best interests of the child and
with due regard to the rights of the child.
14 7
142 Betty L.W. v. William E.W,, 569 S.E.2d 77,81 (W. Va. 2002) (per curiam).
143 Id. (quoting Michael K. T., 387 S.E.2d at 867).
144 See id.
145 Michael K. T., 387 S.E.2d at 872.
146 Id.
147 Cleo A. E. v. Rickie Gene E., 438 S.E.2d 886, 889 (W. Va. 1993).
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Considering the court's vested interest in the best interests and/or rights
of children in paternity disestablishment cases, 148 it is unlikely that the court
would allow a putative father to institute a subsequent paternity action when the
result may affect a child's relationship with his or her father or the child's re-
ceipt of support payments. Unfortunately, West Virginia has limited case law
dealing with paternity fraud in comparison to other jurisdictions. As a result, it
may be practical to explore other jurisdictions' unique processes for dealing
with paternity fraud cases.
D. How Other States are Dealing with Paternity Fraud
Several states are beginning to take affirmative measures in handling
paternity fraud cases. Georgia recently enacted a statute that allows a putative
father to file a motion to set aside a motion of paternity. 149 This statute only
permits a putative father to file a motion to set aside paternity if he has not:
(A) Married the mother of the child and voluntarily assumed the
parental obligation and duty to pay child support; (B) Acknowl-
edged his paternity of the child in a sworn statement; (C) Been
named as the child's biological father on the child's birth certifi-
cate with his consent; (D) Been required to support the child
because of a written voluntary promise; (E) Received written
notice from the Department of Human Resources, any other
state agency, or any court directing him to submit to genetic
testing which he disregarded; (F) Signed a voluntary acknowl-
edgment of paternity as provided in Code Section 19-7-46.1; or
(G) Proclaimed himself to be the child's biological father. 150
Unfortunately, in most cases where a putative father seeks to disestab-
lish the paternity of a child born during his marriage, he has already done one of
the following acts throughout his marriage or during the divorce process: "been
named as the child's biological father on the child's birth certificate with con-
sent," "signed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity," or has "proclaimed
himself to be the child's biological father." 151 Therefore, even though Georgia
148 See id.
The best interests of the child is the polar star by which decisions must be
made which affect children. Furthermore, a child has a right to an establish-
ment of patemity and a child support obligation, and a right to independent
representation on matters affecting his or her substantial rights and interests.
Id.
149 See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54 (2004).
150 Id. § 19-7-54(b)(5)(A)-(G).
151 Id.
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intended to thwart paternity fraud cases by instituting section 19-7-54 of the
Georgia Code, this statute has not become a solution for putative fathers who
pay child support for children born during their marriage.
While in the minority, Utah is one jurisdiction that has allowed a puta-
tive father, who disestablished paternity after a final divorce decree, to institute
a subsequent action based on fraud. The Utah Court of Appeals, in Masters v.
Worsley, 152 allowed a putative father to institute a subsequent hearing based on
allegations of paternity fraud. 153 Masters' wife was unfaithful during their mar-
riage. 154 Throughout the marriage and after the marriage ended, she denied
being unfaithful. 155 As a result, Masters was under the impression that he fa-
thered all five of the children born during his marriage, and thus, he agreed to
pay child support in the final divorce order. 156 After Masters discovered that he
only fathered two of the five children born during his marriage, he sought to
institute an action "for modification of the divorce decree on the basis of
fraud."'157 The trial court refused to hear Masters' fraud claim and granted his
ex-wife's motion for summary judgment. 158 The appellate court reversed the
trial court's motion for summary judgment and found that Masters' ex-wife
committed fraud. 
59
Similarly, a Virginia court charged a mother with fraud because she rep-
resented in a divorce order that the putative father was the biological father of
their child.160 The mother admitted that she had "misrepresented a material fact
in the divorce proceeding." 6 1 As a result of this misrepresentation, the trial
court found that the putative father was not the child's biological father and de-
clined to hold him responsible for child support.162 The Virginia Court of Ap-
peals later affirmed this decision and held that the mother's conduct successfully
satisfied the elements of fraud.
163
152 777 P.2d 499 (1989).
153 Id
154 Id. at 500.
155 Id. at 502.
156 Id at 500.
157 id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 504.
160 See Batrouny v. Batrouny, 412 S.E.2d 721, 723-24 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
161 Id. at 723.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 723-24.
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Florida, a jurisdiction that recognizes the distinction between intrinsic
and extrinsic fraud, held a mother liable for extrinsic fraud after fraudulently
concealing the paternity of her child.' 64 In the case of MA.F. v. G.L.K.,165 a
putative father was informed, four years after his divorce, that he was not the
biological father of his child. 166 The court held that res judicata did not prohibit
a putative father from instituting a subsequent cause of action because "when a
wife knows that her husband is not the father of the children, and the husband
does not know, concealment of that knowledge in a divorce proceeding involv-
ing child support is extrinsic fraud upon the court."
167
Regardless of jurisdiction, paternity fraud cases are becoming more fre-
quent throughout the United States. While William in Betty L. W. had the mak-
ings to institute a persuasive paternity fraud case, William did not raise the issue
of paternity fraud. Perhaps this suggests a lack of awareness about paternity
fraud among victims of fraud in West Virginia. Nonetheless, it is crucial that
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals establish an effective method for
dealing with paternity fraud cases to provide justice to putative fathers and the
children involved.
IV. THE WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS'
ANALYSIS OF BETTYL. W.
In Betty L. W., the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals justified the
use of the doctrine of res judicata based on the application of West Virginia
precedent, particularly Nancy Darlene M v. James Lee M and N. C. v.W.R.C.
168
While these cases are similar to Betty L. W., because they both concern the issue
of paternity disestablishment, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was
incorrect in using these cases to justify its use of res judicata in Betty L. W. be-
cause of critical factual differences. This section will introduce Nancy Darlene
M and N. C. and compare and contrast these cases with Betty L. W. to highlight
the court's error in using these cases to justify its holding in Betty L. W.
In Nancy Darlene M, 169 Nancy and James were married in 1974 and
gave birth to L.D.M. in 1979.170 In 1980, Nancy filed for divorce and in the
divorce decree, both she and James asserted that L.D.M. was born of the mar-
164 See M.A.F. v. G.L.K., 573 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 863.
167 Id.
168 Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 82-83 (W. Va. 2002) (per curiam).
169 400 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va. 1990).
170 Id. at 883.
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riage. 17 1 Nancy gained custody and James was instructed to pay child support
in the amount of $250.00 per month. 172 At the time of the divorce, James was in
the Marine Corps stationed in California. 17 3  Due to his failure to pay child
support, Nancy filed a petition to enforce the child support obligation initiated
by and through the Marion County prosecutor's office and filed in the Superior
Court of Orange County, California. The California court ordered Nancy and
the child to submit blood testing. 175 Because Nancy failed to comply with this
request, the California court entered an order which denied Nancy's child su -
port enforcement petition finding that James was not the father of the child.
Despite this finding and with the assistance of the Marion County Child Advo-
cate Office, Nancy successfully caused James' wages to be attached. 177 In
1988, James filed a motion with the family law master of West Virginia to ter-
minate child support payments. 178 At the hearing before the family law master,
James admitted that he "observed the appellant [Nancy] having sexual inter-
course with another male in February, 1979, and that in April, 1979, when the
appellant discovered that she was pregnant, she informed the appellee [James]
that he was not the father of the unborn child." 179 The family law master found
that paternity had been settled by the West Virginia circuit court and suggested a
reinstatement of Nancy's child support payments in the amount of $250.00 per
month. 180 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that "the paternity
determination issue in this case had been adjudicated, and, therefore, such de-
termination is resjudicata."'
81
In Nancy Darlene M., James admitted that he observed Nancy having
sex with another man during their marriage. 182 He also admitted that Nancy
told him that he was not L.D.M.'s father. 183 Even though he had knowledge
that he was not the father, he still acknowledged paternity in the divorce de-
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 883-84.
175 Id
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 887.
182 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
183 Nancy Darlene M, 400 S.E.2d at 884.
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184
cree. Based on these facts, the court could have relied on the doctrine of eq-
uitable estoppel along with the doctrine of res judicata to find James liable for
child support.'
8 5
Prior to the onset of Nancy Darlene M, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, in Michael K.T., explained the premise behind precluding a
subsequent paternity hearing based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 186 The
court stated,
[e]ven if blood test evidence excludes paternity in a given case,
the trial judge should refuse to permit blood test evidence which
would disprove paternity when the individual attempting to dis-
establish paternity has held himself out to be the father of the
child for a sufficient period of time such that dis roof of pater-
nity would result in undeniable harm to the child.
The theory behind the application of equitable estoppel is that "undeniable
harm" would befall a child if that child's putative father was allowed to dises-
tablish paternity after he held himself out to be that child's father. 188 Thus, in
Nancy Darlene M., the court was able to conclude that James held himself out to
be L.D.M.'s father based on the fact that James admitted to paternity in the di-
vorce petition after he was told that he was not L.D.M.'s father.189 Therefore,
since James acknowledged that he was L.D.M.'s biological father, with informa-
tion to the contrary, the court could have precluded a subsequent hearing on the
bases of equitable estoppel as well as the doctrine of res judicata. 1
90
In Nancy Darlene M, James could not claim the benefit of an exception
to the doctrine of res judicata because the issue of paternity could have been.- .. 191
addressed during the divorce proceeding. James was explicitly informed that
he was not L.D.M.'s father. 192 Fraud, as an exception to res judicata, is not ap-
plicable to this case because Nancy did not fraudulently conceal L.D.M.'s pater-
nity. Fraud is based on "acts, omissions, and concealments which involve a
breach of legal duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, and which are injurious
184 Id. at 883.
185 Id. at 886-87.
186 Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 871 (W. Va. 1989).
187 Id. at 871.
188 Id. at 871-72.
189 Nancy Darlene M, 400 S.E.2d at 886.
190 Id. at 887.
191 Id. at 886.
192 Id. at 884.
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to another, or by which undue and unconscientous advantage is taken of an-
other." 193 As a result, James was precluded from asserting the fraud exception
as a basis upon which to support a subsequent paternity cause of action.
The distinctions between Nancy Darlene M and Betty L. W. are appar-
ent. James, in Nancy Darlene M, was told that he was not L.D.M.'s biological
father before he signed the divorce decree. 94 Conversely, William in Betty
L. W. did not learn that he was not Crystal's biological father until after he
signed the divorce decree.195 While the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals stated that James' argument in Nancy Darlene M. was "substantially simi-
lar" to the argument forwarded by William in Betty L. W., 196 there are fundamen-
tal and material differences between these two cases. In Nancy Darlene M., the
issue of paternity could have easily been raised during the divorce proceeding,
but in Betty L. W., paternity could not have been raised because William was not
given notice that he was not Crystal's biological father.
Furthermore, in Nancy Darlene M., the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals could have employed both the principals of equitable estoppel and res
judicata to prevent a subsequent paternity hearing. Equitable estoppel, however,
could not have been applied in Betty L. W. because, in this case, William did not
hold himself out to be Crystal's father with knowledge to the contrary.
19 7
Moreover, in Betty L. W, the fraud exception, if raised, may have prevented the
court from exercising the doctrine of res judicata. The fraud exception was not
an option in Nancy Darlene M Therefore, the court's use of Nancy Darlene M.,
as a basis upon which to decide Betty L. W., was erroneous.
In Betty L. W., the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia also ap-
plied the case of N. C v. WR. C. 98 to further its argument regarding the principal. .. . 199
of res judicata. In NC., the parties, N.C. and W.R.C., married in February of
1980 and divorced in November of 1980. 200 While separated, the couple con-
tinued to have sexual relations. 201 N.C. discovered that she was pregnant and
the couple remarried in March of 1981. 202 In 1981, N.C. petitioned for a second
193 Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 752 (W. Va. 1998).
194 Nancy Darlene M, 400 S.E.2d at 884.
195 Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 80 (W. Va. 2002) (per curiam).
196 Id. at 82.
197 Id. at 81.
198 N.C. v. W.R.C., 317 S.E.2d 793 (W. Va. 1984).
199 Betty L. W., 569 S.E.2d at 82-83.
200 N.C., 317 S.E.2d at 794.
201 Id.
202 Id.
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divorce. 203 W.R.C. sought an annulment based his allegation that "the appellee
[N.C.] was pregnant with the child of another man at the time of the remar-• ,,204
rlage. The trial court refused to grant an annulment and the Supreme Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision based on the doctrine of res judi-
cata.205 The court reasoned "[t]he dilemma in which the appellant [W.R.C.]
now finds himself resulted from his fault or negligence in not raising the issue of
paternity through appropriate proceedings prior to the final disposition of his
second divorce." 20 6 Further, "[t]he principal assertion upon which the appellant
based his petition, namely, the lack of resemblance between the child and the
appellant, was available to him prior to the final disposition of his second di-
vorce.
207
Similar to Nancy Darlene M, the court's reliance on N.C. in Betty L. W.
was also misplaced. In Betty L. W. the court stated that in N. C., "this Court af-
firmed the circuit court's decision that the husband was not entitled to relief be-
cause he had failed to raise 'the issue of paternity through appropriate proceed-m s or t thefina dis o ',,208
ings prior to the final disposition' of the divorce. Based on this statement, it
would appear as though N.C. and Betty L. W. are factually similar, but this is far
from true, In N.C., the court was dealing with a situation where the putative
father had reason to believe he was not the biological father of the child, and
despite this knowledge he failed to question paternity in the divorce proceeding.
W.R.C. sought a subsequent paternity hearing based on the fact that there was a
lack of resemblance between the child and W.R.C. 2 0 9 Similar to Nancy Darlene
M., this is a situation where the issue of paternity could have easily been intro-
duced in the divorce proceeding. As the court stated, the lack of resemblance
between the putative father and child was not a new fact that was introduced
- 2 10
after the divorce. Thus, according to the doctrine of res judicata, the putative
father was prohibited from instituting a subsequent suit.
211
The key distinction between Betty L. W. versus Nancy Darlene M. and
N.C. is that the putative fathers in Nancy Darlene M and N.C. had notice that
they were not the biological fathers of their children. This notice precluded the
203 Id.
204 Id. at 795.
205 Id. at 795-97.
206 Id. at 797.
207 Id.
208 Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 82-83 (W. Va. 2002) (per curiam) (quoting
N.C., 317 S.E.2d at 797).
209 N.C., 317 S.E.2d at 797.
210 Id.
211 Id.
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putative fathers in Nancy Darlene M. and N. C. from arguing fraud or initiating a
subsequent paternity cause of action. Unlike the putative fathers in Nancy Dar-
lene M and N. C., William in Betty L. W. was not put on notice that he was not
Crystal's biological father. The court's failure to expressly recognize this key
distinction between the cases may have been the predicate behind its decision to
disallow William to undergo a subsequent paternity cause of action.
V. STATES THAT REFUSE TO APPLY RES JUDICATA IN PATERNITY
DISESTABLISHMENT CASES
A number of jurisdictions outside of West Virginia have rejected the
application of res judicata to paternity disestablishment cases largely because of
public policy.212 These courts have recognized that the application of res judi-
cata to paternity disestablishment cases unjustly affects both the putative father
and his child.2 13 This section will highlight cases in jurisdictions that refuse to
apply res judicata to paternity disestablishment cases and pinpoint the public
policy considerations behind this decision.
In Spears v. Spears,214 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky recognized
that "res judicata is to be applied in particular situations as fairness and justice
require, and that it is not to be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice,
or so as to work an injustice." 215 Spears acknowledged that even though there
may be compelling reasons to preclude a subsequent paternity cause of action
based on res judicata, "the doctrine 'must at times be weighed against compet-
ing interests, and must, on occasion, yield to other policies."'
216
In Langston v. Riffe, 217 the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the
following quotation from the Court of Appeals of Kentucky: "'to apply res judi-
cata to preclude [the father] from challenging paternity, when blood testing has
shown that he is not the father, would work an injustice."' 218 Likewise, the
Court agreed with several statements made in a dissenting opinion from a New
Hampshire court.2 19 Paternity determinations affect "inheritance rights, citizen-
212 See, e.g., Spears v. Spears, 784 S.Wo2d 605, 607 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990). "It is further stated..
. that the doctrine 'must at times be weighed against competing interests, and must, on occasion,
yield to other policies."' Id. (quoting 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 402 (1990)).
213 See id. at 608. "[I]t would be highly unfair and unjust to Clarence [the putative father], and
potentially to the child, if res judicata is ruled to be a bar to his CR 60.02 motion." Id.
214 784 S.W.2d 605 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
215 Spears, 784 S.W.2d at 607 (quoting 46 AM. JUR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 402 (1990)).
216 Id. (quoting 46 AM. JuR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 402).
217 754 A.2d 389 (Md. 2000).
218 Id. at 404 n. 13 (quoting Spears, 784 S.W.2d at 607).
219 Id. at 403 n. 11.
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ship, and the child's knowledge of his or her medical history." 2 20 If a putative
father is precluded from relitigating the issue of paternity, a child may never
know the identity of his true father and may be "prevented from inheriting or
receiving benefits from his actual father, who might be more financially stable
than the putative father."22 1 Further,
"[A]ccurate determinations of paternity are critical, not simply
because a child is entitled to financial support from his or her
father, but also because a child may later be in need of a blood
transfusion or an organ transplant from a compatible family
member. A child may face decisions about marriage and child-
bearing based on the risk of passing on what the child believes
are inherited conditions."
222
Another public policy concern that results from applying res judicata to
paternity disestablishment cases is that a child's biological father is relieved
from taking financial and personal responsibility for his child. 22 3 The Court of
Appeals of Kentucky stated, "it would be unfair ... to decree a man to be...
[the child's] father even though the man bears no relationship to him."'224 The
court reached this conclusion based on Kentucky Revised Statute section
406.111, which affirmatively states, "[i]f the court finds that the conclusions of
all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests, are that the
alleged father is not the father of the child, the question of paternity shall be
resolved accordingly."
225
Some states have found ways to circumvent the application of res judi-
• • •226
cata to paternity disestablishment cases. They have explicit laws in place to
address the course of action that should be taken when blood testing or DNA
220 Id. (quoting Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 648 A.2d 439, 451 (Md. 1994) (Eldridge, J., dissent-
ing)).
221 Id.
222 Id. (quoting Tandra S., 648 A.2d at 451 (Eldridge, J., dissenting)).
223 See Crowder v. Commonwealth 745 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988). "Yet the
Commonwealth could never seek reimbursement legally due from ... [the child's] father because
a stranger to ... [the child] would be deemed his father, and he would be relieved from payment
of support." Id.
224 id.
225 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 406.111 (Michie 2002).
226 See Cohen v. Nudelman, 604 S.E.2d 580, 583-84 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Walter v. Gunter,
788 A.2d 609, 617-18 (Md. 2002); Evans v. Wilson, 856 A.2d 679, 689-90 (Md. 2004); C.R. v.
J.G., 703 A.2d 385, 394 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1997); Poskabarbiewicsz v. Poskabarbiewicsz,
2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1313, **6-7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); In the Interest of A.N.M., 2000 Tex.
App. LEXIS 4504, **3-10 (Tex. App. 2000).
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tests conclusively reveal that a putative father is not the biological father of his
child.
227
While the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is known for mak-
ing decisions based on the best interests and rights of the children involved in
paternity disestablishment cases,228 as seen above, these jurisdictions have also
considered the best interests and rights of the children at issue. The difference
between West Virginia and the aforementioned jurisdictions is the difference in
public policy objectives. These jurisdictions value a child's right to have his or
her biological father legally acknowledged rather than the child's putative fa-
ther.
VI. WEST VIRGINIA'S SOLUTION?
Thus far, this note has addressed the problems that result from applying
the doctrine of res judicata after a final divorce decree has been rendered, the
exceptions to the doctrine of res judicata, and the competing interests of putative
fathers and children involved in paternity fraud cases. The most critical issue
that remains to be discussed, however, is West Virginia's solution to the prob-
lem that arises from applying the doctrine of res judicata to cases where putative
fathers are victims of paternity fraud. Unfortunately, there are several reasons
why West Virginia will encounter significant difficulty in reaching a practical
and worthwhile solution. Thus, the goal of this section is to explain how West
Virginia public policy bars West Virginia from adopting the solutions under-
taken in other states, discuss other reasons for West Virginia's difficulty in un-
covering a solution that appeases both the children and putative fathers in-
volved, and propose a probable solution to the present problem.
Even though more states are beginning to allow putative fathers to cease
paying child support when a child's paternity has been fraudulently concealed,
this solution is unlikely to resonate with the West Virginia judiciary because the
West Virginia judiciary highly favors the best interests and rights of a child.
Accordingly, it is unlikely that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
will uphold a solution, despite its practicality and ingenuity, if such solution
offends West Virginia public policy. Thus, before suggesting in-haste that West
Virginia follow the lead of other states that have resolved this problem, I find it
necessary to contrast West Virginia public policy with that of other states in
order to reach a meaningful solution.
Despite the fact that other states allow putative fathers to cease making
child support payments based on their public policy,229 this remedy proves futile
in West Virginia. It is unlikely that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
227 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.111; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43 (West 2004); OHIo REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 3111.03, 3119.962 (West 2005).
228 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 214, 226, and 227 and accompanying text.
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peals would allow putative fathers to cease making child support payments,
even in the presence of fraudulent conduct. In doing so, there is a great chance
that the rights and best interests of West Virginia children would be compro-
mised in light of West Virginia's unique economic status. In considering the
best interests and rights of a child, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
examined the following: the amount of time the child was led to believe that he
or she was fathered by the putative father, 23 the relationship between the child
and the putative father,23 1 the age of the child,23 2 the child's right to child sup-
port,233 and "all other factors which may affect the equities involved in the po-
tential disruption of the parent/child relationship or the chances of undeniable
harm., 234 Given West Virginia public policy, the precedent set by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, and the standard cited above, it is safe to
assume that the court will determine that the best interests and rights of children
supersede a putative father's interest in instituting a subsequent paternity cause
of action on the basis of paternity fraud.
This is not to suggest that other states do not place great weight on the
best interests and rights of a child in considering paternity fraud cases. In fact, a
West Virginia case has recognized that the trend in the United States court sys-
tem has moved toward considering the best interests and rights of a child in
making decisions concerning paternity disestablishment. 235 However, it is also
known that United States courts have consistently allowed fraud to be an excep-
tion to the most stringent rules. "[A]bsent evidence of fraudulent conduct which
prevented the putative father from questioning paternity, this Court will not
sanction the disputation of paternity through blood test evidence if there has
been more than a relatively brief passage of time." 236 Given this reasoning,
many states are undeniably justified in allowing a putative father to cease mak-
ing child support payments when a child's paternity has been fraudulently con-
cealed.
230 See Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 86 (W. Va. 2002) (per curiam).
231 See id.
232 See Cleo A.E. v. Rickie Gene E., 438 S.E.2d 886, 889 (W. Va. 1993).
233 See Betty L. W., 569 S.E.2dat 86; see also Wyattv. Wyatt, 408 S.E.2d 51,54 (W. Va. 1991)
(stating that "[t]he duty of a parent to support a child is a basic duty owed by the parent to the
child"); State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., Child Support Enforcement Div. v.
Michael George K., 531 S.E.2d 669, 674 (W. Va. 2000) (stating that "the State has a broad role in
the enforcement of child support, including the establishment of paternity in disputed cases").
234 Cleo A.E., 438 S.E.2d at 889.
235 See id. "Although historically courts have addressed issues affecting children primarily in
the context of competing adults' rights, the present trend in courts throughout the country is to
give greater recognition to the rights of children, including their right to independent representa-
tion in proceedings affecting substantial rights." Id. (emphasis added).
236 Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 872 (W. Va. 1989).
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has a valid concern in
seeking to protect the rights and interests of children in paternity disestablish-
ment cases. Crystal's best interests and rights were probably the court's princi-
• 237
pal motivations behind the court's conclusion in Betty L. W. However, forc-
ing a putative father to continue to pay child support while the fraud-inducing
mother escapes punishment is hardly just.
While West Virginia may not be receptive to allowing a putative father
to cease making child support payments in cases where a mother has committed
paternity fraud, the most attractive alternative, which would oblige both the in-
terests of the putative father and the children involved, is to punish the fraud-
inducing mother. While punishing the fraud-inducing mother seems like a
straightforward solution to paternity fraud, this solution becomes complicated
when trying to determine a punishment that seeks both to deter women from
committing paternity fraud while ensuring that the best interests and rights of a
child are protected. Monetary sanctions extract money from a child's household
thus compromising the best interests of the child and diminishing the rationale
behind ordering a putative father to continue making child support payments.
Similarly, imprisonment detracts from the best interests of a child because the
child would then be separated from his or her mother.
Because states have not yet determined a means of punishing fraud-
inducing mothers without causing injury to the child or children involved, the
current reality is that fraud-inducing mothers in West Virginia have and will
continue to escape punishment in paternity fraud cases. However, if the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals genuine concern for protecting the best in-
terests and rights of West Virginia children is the driving factor behind forcing
putative fathers to continue paying child support in paternity fraud cases, there
should be some method to ensure that child support payments made by putative
fathers to fraud-inducing mothers are used solely for the benefit of the child.
West Virginia Code section 48-13-802(a) gives the court the authority
to "direct that a portion of child support be placed in trust and invested for fu-
ture educational or other needs of the child."'238 Further, this statute also gives
the court the power to name a trustee of the trust:
The court may prescribe the powers of the trustee and provide
for the management and control of the trust. Upon petition of a
party or the child's guardian or next friend and upon a showing
of good cause, the court may order the release of funds in the
trust from time to time.
239
237 569 S.E.2d at 86.
238 W. VA. CODE § 48-13-802(a) (2001).
239 Id § 4 8 -13 -802(c).
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Similar to West Virginia Code section 48-13-802(a), the legislature
could enact a statute that requires a putative father, who has proved paternity
fraud, to deposit child support payments into a trust managed by a court ap-
pointed trustee. The fraud-inducing mother should only be allowed to withdraw
the funds upon proof that the funds would be used for the direct benefit of the
child. Furthermore, if the fraud-inducing mother is allowed to withdraw from
the child support fund, she should be required to produce receipts for all pur-
chases made using the funds. This system would ensure that the fraud-inducing
mother is using the child support for its intended purpose. In addition, this sys-
tem would deter fraud-inducing mothers from committing paternity fraud.
While this suggestion is mild in its effect because it does not fully en-
sure that the rights and interests of children and putative fathers are protected, a
fair and just solution that serves the interest of defrauded putative fathers while
conforming to West Virginia public policy will be difficult to ascertain for the
reasons stated above. While a more detailed and practical solution may be well
beyond the scope of this article, the purpose of this article is to call attention to
the serious and intensifying problem of the affects of res judicata on paternity
disestablishment and paternity fraud as an exception to res judicata.
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